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More facts about the Democratic Alliance

 This post continues with ten facts about the DA. Fact:

6.           DA participates in rightwing victim narrative and conspiracy theories

 In 2019 after a white Stellenbosch farmer was murdered in a likely crime of opportunity, the WCG was so outraged that at a media conference the agriculture MEC announced the formation of a task team to coordinate a response to farm killings. The farmer’s murder was blazoned across the media.

 That same week an NGO released a report about the very high numbers of women and children murdered each in the country each year. It received almost no attention. The DA too is silent about Cape Town’s – the country’s crime capital – high crime rate, especially in black and brown communities.

 The rightwing call farm murders, which to them means white victims while ignoring other races, “[white] genocide”. However, independent research and police statistics are unable to prove their theory.

 Farm murders are a touchstone and often aired on rightwing media like Politicsweb where it’s used as a white-rights rallying cry. Its editor James Myburgh wrote about it and argued with the Washington Post about the accuracy of the figures, pointlessly because data is lacking and anything else is conjecture.

 The right’s conspiracy is white farmers, and by extension all whites/Afrikaners, are threatened by extinction from blacks, black economic empowerment and life in general in the new, if struggling, South Africa under the ANC.

 But they ignore the well-known fact that whites are still financially and socially secure and as affluent as they were under apartheid, or even more so since the end of apartheid has given them opportunities that were lacking before.

Zille/DA concurred with Myburgh’s et al victimology and conspiracies.

7.          DA cadre deployment

 Cadre deployment is the appointment of party apparatchiks to posts at all levels of government departments and agencies. Competence and merit are usually not considered. It goes beyond political appointments to ensure control and implementation of the ruling party’s political ideology and the direction of the state it wants. Cadre deployment is a key ANC strategy to further its long-term strategy. In South Africa, cadre deployment is largely responsible for the failure of service delivery of government and public enterprises.

 The DA, like most South Africans, is critical of it. But they too practise it. Here are a few examples. 

·         Lindiwie Mazibuko and Mmusi Maimane. Helen Zille appointed these young, then early 30s, unknown black woman and man as the DA’s parliamentary leaders (as party leader she refused to lead from Parliament as is customary, choosing what she believed to be the prestigious and better paid job as Western Cape premier, relegating leader of the opposition to second place) over experienced and qualified candidates, Prof. Wilmot James among them. Although this was a political appointment, it had elements of cadre deployment in that Maimane was unqualified, grateful and malleable to the leader’s wishes and party’s indoctrination.

 Mazibuko was a different sort, though. A graduate, she was an able representative who had a mind of her own. Zille fired her, and spitefully released unflattering information, after they clashed.

·         John Steenhuisen. Steenhuisen is the first leader of the DA not to have gone to university. For a party that claims to value skills and education, this is a strange promotion except he meets that criteria for cadre deployment: lack of qualifications. Even EFF leader Julius Malema, who the rightwing demonise, has a university degree earned part-time. Steenhuisen is Zille’s candidate and like Maimane is pliable to the leader’s and party’s indoctrination. 

·         Xanthea Limberg. After the 2016 local government elections, new DA Mayor Patricia de Lille appointed 32 year-old Limberg, a proportional representative Belville South councillor (she did not have to contest the election in her ward) as executive mayoral committee member for water and sanitation. Mayco are executive positions, head political officer and de facto executive officers of the city’s administrative departments. Limberg was unqualified for the job. Her previous work experience was De Lille’s speech writer when she was Independent Democrats in Parliament. Her incompetence, and De Lille’s and DA-run city’s, was revealed during the 2017-18 water crisis. 

·         Geordin Hill-Lewis. In 2009 when Zille became premier of Western Cape, she appointed Hill-Lewis, then only 22, as her chief of staff. Chief of staffs are the most senior administrative posts in government. He was appointed straight out of UCT (honours politics) and his only experience was DA volunteer in the 2009 general elections. This was a curious appointment and shouted cadre deployment and nepotism (Zille’s husband was a former UCT professor and her son a student around the same time Hill-Lewis was there).  

       In 2014 after the elections, Hill-Lewis was catapulted to Parliament as the DA’s trade spokesman (shadow minister) and later to finance. But unlike previous DA members with those portfolios, he was workmanlike. In another cadre deployment, in 2021 Hill-Lewis was appointed DA mayor in Cape Town.

         ·      Tim Harris. Harris was the DA’s finance spokesman in Parliament until 2015 when he left to                  take the acting CEO of Wesgro, the Western Cape government’s economic development                          agency. Alan Winde, then economic affairs MEC, appointed him.

             Harris and Winde stepped into a national political argument with the ANC about scarce skills                 and immigration. They claimed, without evidence, that the supposed skills shortage is                             irreparably “harming the economy of the Western Cape” and that skills be must imported. The                 post of Wesgro CEO was advertised attracting 99 highly qualified candidates. While Harris held              a Master’s in economics, he had no current practical experience. He got the job, though. No                     skills needed to be imported.

         ·         Alan Winde. Winde, whose highest education is a school leaving certificate, was appointed                    premier of the Western Cape after Zille’s retirement. However, he’s not the most qualified for                 that position. Others in the DA could more ably fill the post, but to be fair he has not done too                 badly. However, he fits the profile of a cadre – unqualified and malleable to the leader’s                        demands. Winde was Zille’s appointee. 

         ·         Beth Engelbrecht. Engelbrecht was the head of the Western Cape Health Department                            (WCHD) from 2015 to 2020. She was Zille’s appointee. In 2017 Zille fully endorsed her and                 other WCHD officials who’d been accused of serious ethical and professional misconduct                     without even investigating the charges.

                Engelbrecht, a medical doctor, appeared to be out of her depth, though. She could not even                     read basic department financial information published in their annual report and in 2019                         lied/misrepresented to the public and WC legislature about it. Making falsehoods to                                 parliament is an offense. The auditor-general was informed and Afriforum laid criminal                         charges against her regarding irregular spending. She likely was let go because of these                         transgressions.

         ·         Nomaindia French (and other MECs). French is the health MEC. However, she’s a cipher, the                 DA’s token black. She too lied to the public and WC legislature about department resources                     and operations. Incidentally, health MECs have no real purpose, that already being served by                 the head of department.

                The City of Cape Town’s chief financial officer previously was Oudshoorn’s treasurer. He’s                     not even a chartered accountant. The city’s mayco for finance is a former water engineer who                 could not even answer questions about his speciality, water. These are typical of DA cadres in                 the Western Cape and Cape Town administrations.

 8.          DA does not equal good governance

The DA is not as good as they and their white-right supporters think. In fact, there is a general misperception in South Africa that they are effective, ethical and clean, i.e. not corrupt, administrators. 

The rightwing Institute of Race Relations’ CEO Frans Cronje wrote before the 2019 general elections that the Western Cape is a “well-run province”, misrepresenting isolated, untested anecdotes each about the Swellendam police station (a national competence, though) and clinic. His claim about a province with 4.5 million people was not credible and clearly done to promote the DA’s campaigning for which the IRR was strategy consultants. Previously conservative commentator RW Johnson (and others), a frequent contributor to the rightwing Politicsweb and Rapport, wrote similar about the city of Cape Town. However, he cited examples of purported governance efficiency neither city nor DA could claim credit for. 

A rightwing fantasy (see Politicsweb, BizNews) is that the Western Cape should secede from South Africa under DA rule and insulate itself from ANC corruption and maladministration. The real reason, though, is blacks are a minority compared to other provinces and the province would be a white-run utopia.   

The DA’s management of the 2017/18 water crisis, where it was caught despite having been warned from 2015, showed its Achilles heel: exaggerated confidence and belief in their abilities. As a result, Cape Town was the first major city that came very close to running out of water. 

Health and education are the only key areas that provincial governments can be assessed on. While education may be acceptable based on standard outcomes, Western Cape Health Department is is not doing too well, some say failing the people it serves. It received a clean audit it did not deserve, by its own admission being unable to measure performance outcomes but still giving itself a pass on them. 

The DA are able, but not excellent financial managers. But since finance is less than half overall governance (financial performance is incorrectly equated with good governance), DA administrations score around 50%.

The DA, constant critics of ANC corruption and on maladministration, are soft on it when it appears in its administrations.

Zille’s son ran an IT company with a partner. They tendered for providing software to the WC Education Department. Contrary tender and supply chain regulations and good governance standards, Zille intervened and demanded the tender board grant the contract, mentioning her son’s company by name. When it became public, she claimed she had not pressurised the department to give the contract to her son. But what other interpretation was there? The department too ought to have rejected her interference. 

Zille too interfered in a criminal/inquest investigation against WC Health Department employees including head Beth Engelbrecht. The NPA and police gave her representative confidential information and  immediately dropped the case. 

DA head office – Steenhuisen, Maimane and exco – launched a well-publicised investigation of maladministration related to a MyCiti bus contract against then mayor Patricia de Lille. Note party structures have no legal role in local government. They released allegations to the public and issued the infamous Steenhuisen Report that was supposed to make the case against her. they hired law firm Bowman’s to conduct a forensic investigation, which merely repeated Steenhuisen’s unsubstantiated allegations. Steenhuisen found a Durban-based former contractor to the city who in an affidavit claimed De Lille improperly influenced the tender five years before.

None of the allegations were substantiated and it was clear it was a witch-hunt but that did not matter to the DA’s rightwing supporters in Politicsweb and elsewhere who already convicted De Lille. De Lille fought back, winning three cases in court. Steenhuisen’s findings – he has no forensic training and Bowman’s report were discredited and withdrawn. But the DA had what they wanted – De Lille suspended and forcing her resignation.

This spectacle – more gladiatorial games than due process – proved the DA ignore corruption and poor governance in its ranks when it suits itself, particular when it concerns white members.

9.          DA does not practise racial equality 

The DA says it’s the most racially representative party in the country. They mean by registered members but voters are where it counts. The majority of the party’s voters are whites followed by brown. 

The fact that it’s perceived as a white party and do not represent black interests is one reason it’s been unable to grow in black communities. Their “fight back” election campaign 15 years ago was misrepresented as fighting back against black rule, which was exploited by the ANC, rather than against Jacob Zuma-led corruption. The anti-black moniker has never really been forgotten. 

Out of the country’s 60 million people, about 4.5 million are white, 4 million brown and 2 million Indian and other. But whites hold 50% of political positions in the National Assembly, Western Cape legislature and cabinet and DA municipality councils. The DA’s executive committee is white-run, with Zille succeeding a pale male as chair. They claim appointments are made on merit, implying whites are more qualified than non-whites, but that was not true 10 years after democracy and less so after 30 years. In the Western Cape Alan Winde, who was a so-so economic affairs MEC, is neither the most qualified nor experienced. 

Another problem is they have former National Party members in positions of power, for example, Anton Bredell. 

This indicates the party is not racially equitable which they themselves recognised (while claiming the opposite). It was why Zille appointed blacks – Lindiwie Mazibuko, Maimane, Patricia de Lille – to leadership positions despite them not having been the best people for the jobs. The wisdom was without a black leader, the DA would not get significant black voters. This was one reason why capable politicians like Wilmot James were overlooked – he is brown.

 However, it made no difference because Maimane and De Lille, until she became too powerful and was removed after a Steenhuisen-led putsch, were viewed as Zille/exco puppets and hat their promotions would not change the racial balance and white-centred outlook of the party.

10.          DA’s declining voter support

 This was proven true when in the 2021 local elections the DA lost the white/Afrikaner ward in Schweitze-Reneke, mainly to Freedom Front+. Zille, shocked, initiated an investigation to determine why it lost white support. During the same election it lost a ward in a black area of Cape Town and lost seats while retaining the ward in Mitchell’s Plain. There was no inquiry and Zille and DA were silent about that.

 Her appointment as exco chair and Steenhuisen’s as parliamentary leader suggest, after her concerns about whites, the DA is re-establishing itself as a white interest party contesting the same political space as FF+ on the far right. 

Brown minority interests again take second place. After De Lille was removed as Cape Town’s mayor following a witch-hunt initiated by DA head office (exco) and lead by Steenhuisen and the minority conservative caucus in council, she and her supporters in council complained non-white members and voters are only useful to the party during elections. And that white DA members and leadership rarely visit those areas except election time. 

Under Tony Leon and the first five years of Zille, the party grew to 23% voter support. At the 2019 election it dropped a percentage. It’s unlikely, especially now it’s competing for the same support as FF+ and similar conservative parties like ACDP, it shall achieve its past support. 

The ANC are expected to continue losing support, analysts saying within five to ten years below 50%. I predict at the 2024 elections it will drop to 52 or 53%. The DA could have taken some of this support had it been the progressive centre-liberal party it once was. Now, though, it’s doomed to contest the marginalised conservative base. 

Helen Zille, once an astute, progressive politician, has taken the DA into the wilderness. There’s nothing in South Africa’s socio-political milieu that should have made it so. But there are two explanations. 

The first is that among particularly white DA members and supporters, even those who superficially call themselves liberals, there’s a conservatism that under real or imagined threat come out. 

The second is Zille, having power as premier and party leader, became corrupted by it. She believes in the myth the adoring media and her fans created about her, that she’s special, an icon as Nelson Mandela was to the country and ANC. The media and analysts especially treated her as if she’s infallible, an oracle. It’s likely, though, she was always like that; people cannot change who they really are. 

Zille lacks the humility to keep her ego in check. Deciding to become premier of the Western Cape rather than lead the DA and set its national agenda from parliament proves this. To her the premiership was more important and offered a larger personal profile, to her followers included who equated the post with political sagacity and achievement. But in South Africa provincial premiers and legislatures are effectively sinecures – they have no real power being mere funding channels for national government. 

So Zille, herself a puppet of the national government agenda, in turn pulled the strings of her puppets, Mazibuko, Maimane, De Lille, Steenhuisen and so on who muddled along while Zille occupied herself like a banana republic dictator from Wale Street where she literally showed the soles of her feet to her subjects. 

She pronounced on all matter of matters “From the Inside” particularly outside of her personal experience or remit as a politician including who Eskom may or may not load shed or telling the auditor-general, indeed international auditing practice, they’re wrong about accounting standards. 

The decline and fall of the DA came about with Zille. The facts are clear as mud. But still the DA cling to the deception she is the appropriate person to lead.

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